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Introduction 
The pursuit of happiness has been a fundamen-tal topic of philosophy for millennia an thrived 
especially in ancient Hellenistic philosophy. In psy-
chology, the study of happiness has become a major 
field of inquiry notably since the advent of Positive 
Psychology (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000; 
Seligman 2002). Positive Psychology is a strength-
based approach, which, in its first version, understood 
“happiness” as a combination of the pleasant, the 
good [i.e. virtuous] and the meaningful life. In Selig-
man’s (2011) final version, the concept of well-being 
in positive psychology has been defined through the 
acronym PERMA (Positive emotion [pleasure], En-
gagement [exercising virtue, finding flow], positive 
Relationships, Meaning [using signature strengths 
for a larger purpose] and Achievement), though many 
authors also include factors from self-determination 
theory (autonomy, competence, relatedness) (Ryan 
and Deci 2000, 2017) and others. Such approaches 
have been understood as Needing Theories, in that 
they highlight basic needs that are required for hu-
mans to achieve happiness and well-being, even 
though PERMA is more of an integrative model (cf. 
Jayawickrem, Forgeard and Seligman 2012). Like-
wise, in this article I define happiness via Needing 
Theories broadly as the fulfillment of such basic psy-
chological needs and use “happy” or “happiness” with 
quotation marks as a theory-independent proxy term 
for the subjectively positive and desirable state of be-
ing that theories of happiness are concerned with.  
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However, since the very beginning of Positive Psy-
chology (which gave “happiness” as a psychological 
field of inquiry public fame and opened it for interdis-
ciplinary discussion) the field has been under criticism 
from social and cultural perspectives. This criticism 
stretches from the general question whether people 
really want to achieve happiness as a primary life goal, 
which is a basic assumption in most WEIRD (West-
ern-Educated-Industrialized-Rich-Democratic) cul-
tures, to social expectations and motivated behavior 
across nations, to specific predictors of happiness in 
a given society, to the expression of affect and the 
kinds of emotions that are (thought to be) felt when 
people describe themselves as “happy” or “satisfied”. 
This article will address several such problems by 
combining the psychological study of happiness 
with Epicurean philosophy of happiness to demon-
strate that drawing on both research traditions can 
solve several cross-cultural problems associated with 
the (largely Western) scientific study of happiness 
by drawing on broader, more inclusive categories to 
explain assumptions from particular traditions. This 
enumeration will yield the following hypotheses: 1) 
The pursuit of happiness is a universal and prime 
motivator of human action, 2) it is to some extent 
possible to resolve apparent cultural oppositions by 
drawing on more inclusive categories based on an-
cient philosophy and positive psychology, and 3) typi-
cal “Eastern” concepts of happiness are highly desired 
also in Western cultures. As will be shown, the third 
hypothesis organically results from the comparison 
of Eastern and Western definitions of the good life, 
especially when considered in light of larger philo-
sophical concepts, such as  ataraxía which cannot be 
directly studied empirically. Still, cultural differences 
do exist and are significant. They seem, however, to 
predominate (aside from particular cultural practices) 
on a deeper level concerning how the self is viewed 
and construed, and thus influence happiness on a 
more abstract level (e.g. Markus and Kitayama 1991; 
Uchida, Norasakkunkit and Kitayama 2004).   
Consequently, it is the overall goal of this article to 
illustrate that, whatever the normative content of a 
culture’s or subculture’s view of happiness may be, it 
should involve the same basic psychological needs 
(here, in particular, drawing on PERMA) or even a 
similar neurochemical substrate. 
Some Cross-Cultural Conflicts in the Psycho-
logical Study of Happiness 
The fact that the majority of studies on happiness 
come from individualist WEIRD cultures has been 
criticized since the onset of positive psychology. Still, 
it would seem unlikely that the hundreds of relevant 
empirical studies have little value in other cultures. A 
useful first approach to tackling this issue is to analyze 
subjective reactions of people from different cultures. 
Three illustrative cases of such cross-cultural objec-
tions are presented in a comment to Schwartz (2000) 
in American Psychologist’s special inaugural edition of 
Positive Psychology. In this article (Ahuvia 2001, 77) 
the author presents three conversations he had with 
Eastern Asian students:
• An Indian doctoral student showed him an Amer-
ican book on the cover of which it said, “we all 
want to be happy” and simply remarked “I don’t”. 
• A Korean student told him explicitly he chose a 
career to be rich so he could bring face [see, e.g., 
Spencer-Oatey 2008] to his parents by buying 
them a new Mercedes. 
• A Singaporean student reported he was going to 
marry his fiancée because it was socially expected 
from him, and not because he expected this union 
would make him happy.  
Of course the question always arises whether indi-
vidual case reports are generalizable to most of the 
population, and how ethical certain attitudes are from 
a normative philosophical perspective. Nonetheless, 
they illustrate some important cultural points which 
will first be considered through psychological research 
on culture, prior to syntheses with philosophical re-
search in the re-analysis. 
  
The first case relates to the more general question if 
happiness is, indeed, the goal (télos) of life as it has 
been assumed since Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1095a), who held that happiness is desirable in its 
own right (1097a). In a similar way, Gautama Buddha 
stated in the Four Noble Truths (cattāri ariyasaccāni) 
that his philosophy offers a systematic way out of the 
omnipresent suffering of the world (Saṃyutta Nikāya, 
56.11), which can be seen as a negative definition of 
happiness. However, Becker and Marecek (2008, 593), 
for example, criticize the “emphasis on gratification 
and feeling good as the endpoint of self-development” 
in the architecture of positive psychology, which, ex-
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plicitly drawing on Aristotle, also assumes well-being 
as a central goal of human life. This is, in fact, a com-
mon misunderstanding. As Haybron (2007, 18) notes, 
“[w]hen happiness gets discussed at all, for instance, 
it is often only to be dismissed as a superficial state of 
cheerfulness. But perhaps the superficiality lies in the 
way people tend to think about happiness and related 
states, and not in the idea that such matters are of cen-
tral importance in a good life.” This kind of hedonic 
view of happiness, as it is probably colloquially under-
stood in most Western cultures, is dominant in Liking 
Theories, in which happiness, in its basic form, is un-
derstood as the sum of hedonic experiences (positive 
emotions) in the absence of negative experiences, of-
ten (falsely) thought to be achieved through fulfilling 
material or otherwise external wants (Lyubomirsky 
2008). In Positive Psychology, however, positive emo-
tion/pleasure is only one dimension of PERMA, and 
engagement and meaning may not always feel good. 
For instance, if a person chooses to climb a frozen cliff 
(Seligman 2002, 119), he is not really enjoying posi-
tive emotion, but he is in a state of flow because he 
does something subjectively meaningful that leads to 
personal growth while exercising signature strengths 
which are matched with an appropriate challenge 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1997; Nakamura and Csikszent-
mihalyi 2002). Thus, Positive Psychology combines 
the hedonic elements of positive emotion with eudai-
monic elements of engagement, meaning and fulfill-
ing one’s human potential ( Jayawickrem et al. 2012). 
As a result, the statement “I don’t want to be happy” 
probably means “I do not support a fully hedonic ap-
proach equating happiness with cheerfulness.”       
The second case above can be explained by differences 
in the value individual achievement receives in dif-
ferent cultures. In North America, happiness is “most 
typically construed as a state contingent on both per-
sonal achievement and positivity of the personal self ”, 
while in Eastern Asian cultures happiness is con-
strued as a state “contingent on social harmony” and 
on a “balance between different selves in a relation-
ship” (Uchida et al. 2004, 227). As a result, personal 
success is not as much a priority as strengthening re-
lationships. To explain, the construal of the self, i.e. of 
personal identity or personhood, is culture-dependent 
and shapes cognition, emotion and motivation evoked 
in social life (see Markus and Kitayama 1991; Kitay-
ama and Park 2007). According to the authors, in in-
dependent (individualistic) cultures the personal self 
is the center of thought, action and motivation. While 
social relationships are important, they are somewhat 
instrumental as they are needed (the R in PERMA) 
for happiness and well-being. Likewise, individuals 
are highly motivated to seek affirmation of the set of 
internal attributes with which they construct a posi-
tive self. Logically, this is best achieved through per-
sonal achievement (see, e.g., Emmons 1991).   
In contrast, in interdependent (collectivist) cultures, 
the personal self is of importance as well, but it is fun-
damentally construed in its relationship with others 
(vs. others are ‘simply’ psychologically needed for per-
sonal well-being). Likewise, the “boundary” between 
self and others is psychologically blurred and nego-
tiated in social interaction. This type of construal of 
the self has clear implications on what kind of be-
havior predicts personal happiness. Oishi and Diener 
(2001), for example, have found that achievement 
of more independent goals increased reported hap-
piness in a European-American sample, while in an 
Asian sample happiness increased as a function of 
the achievement of goals which were less independ-
ent, i.e. more interdependent (often understood as 
bringing happiness to parents). However, both striv-
ing for personal and interpersonal goals can activate 
the motivational system of the brain by indicating 
useful details and rewarding successful steps toward 
achieving a subjectively meaningful goal. Thus, both 
types of goals would equally fulfill the basic hu-
man need for achievement (the A in PERMA).   
Such facts about the construal of the self also help ex-
plain the third case reported above, though additional 
factors also play a role in this case. It has been shown 
that expression of cheerfulness, self-esteem and per-
sonal achievement are typical features of “happiness” 
in individualist cultures, while more quiet affect, 
strengthening social relationships and maintaining 
social harmony are typical features of “happiness” in 
Asian collectivist cultures. Another aspect is the role 
of social norms and expectations. Suh, Diener, Oishi 
and Triandis (1998) studied a massive population (61 
nations, n=62,446) to determine the impact of emo-
tions versus norms as predictors of life satisfaction. 
This study revealed that emotions, not norms, were 
a strong predictor of happiness in more individualist 
nations, while in more collectivist nations both were 
strong predictors. As collectivist cultures are tighter 
than individualist cultures (e.g., Triandis 1994) and 
as uniqueness (vs. similarity with in-group members; 
Kim and Markus 1999) is not a priority, there is more 
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consensus on what is socially appropriate. In addition, 
the social and psychological consequences of deviat-
ing from social norms are much more severe than in 
individualist cultures. Accordingly, having one’s be-
havior judged as appropriate becomes an important 
life task and members would pay close attention to 
what others feel, think or expect (Suh et al. 1998). In 
the words of the authors: 
“In [collectivist] cultures, the major normative 
task is to maintain harmony with others by com-
ing to terms with their needs and expectations. If 
necessary, individuals are expected to subordinate 
their personal feelings and wishes to the goals of 
their in-group (e.g., family). Whereas authentic-
ity to one’s inner feelings is often regarded as a 
virtue in individualist cultures, in many cases, it is 
construed as sign of personal immaturity or self-
ishness in collectivist cultures” (p. 483). 
Consequently, adapting to social norms and fulfilling 
relational obligations is of prime importance in or-
der to attain happiness. From a Western perspective, 
this would be seen as colliding with the fundamental 
assumption about the independence of each self as it 
was of prime importance in Renaissance Humanism 
and Kantian Enlightenment. For Kant, for example, 
exercising total autonomy by means of pure reason 
(reine Vernunft) untainted by social influence is seen as 
the only way to arrive at truly moral judgment (Kant 
2011 [1785]). In contrast, Confucianism, Taoism and 
Buddhism promote a holistic worldview in which 
everything is connected to everything else (even 
though in Buddhism, for example, achieving clarity of 
mind (vipassanā) by mindfully abstracting from past 
experiences and future expectations is a necessary re-
quirement to overcome suffering; Digha Nikāya, 22). 
However, in light of the analysis of the construction 
of the self in relation to others and the high priori-
ty given to social harmony, it becomes clear why in 
Asian collectivism social harmony (as, e.g., achieved 
by fulfilling relational expectations) is a higher pre-
dictor of happiness and life satisfaction than positive 
emotion. Still, social relations have been found to be 
an essential component of human well-being in var-
ious psychological needing theories – from belonging 
in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, to McClelland’s need 
for affiliation (nAff ) to relatedness in Deci and Ryan’s 
self-determination theory, to positive relationships in 
positive psychology’s PERMA system. Indeed, SWB 
research has suggested that positive relationships may 
be the single most important source of happiness 
(Reis and Gable 2003), however culturally construed.
 
Philosophical Theory Building: Epicurean 
Notions of the Good Life
Thus far, some of the social psychology literature 
on culturally different views of happiness has been 
reviewed and interpreted via needing theories of 
happiness.  Additionally, certain cultural practic-
es can usefully be evaluated and synthesized under 
an Epicurean framework, which, drawing on some 
research on cultural dimensions (Hofstede, Hofst-
ede and Minkov 2010), perhaps unexpectedly in-
dicates that certain Eastern values may be quite 
conducive the world over, at least if somewhat cultur-
ally mediated under an Epicurean framework.   
Ancient eudaimonistic philosophies generally viewed 
“happiness” as the highest good (summum bonum). 
However, Epicurus qualified this concept significantly 
by distinguishing simple pleasures (hēdonē kata kinesin) 
and abiding pleasure (katastēmatikē hēdonē) (Diogenes 
Laertios [DL], X.136) as sources of happiness. Among 
the latter are friendship and social harmony (Kyriai 
Doxai [KD], XXVII), learning/discovery (Gnomologi-
um Vaticanum, 27; DL, X.120), fearlessness (Letter to 
Herodotos, 37, 80; Letter to Pythokles, 116), and seren-
ity/imperturbability (ataraxía), which is seen as the 
highest goal (télos) (Letter to Menoikeus [LMen], 128, 
130). In the latter passage, Epicurus states: “When 
we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim1, we do 
not mean the pleasures of the insatiable or the simple 
pleasures of sensuality [but] the absence of pain in the 
body (aponía) and of trouble in the soul (ataraxía)”. 
In order to assess which pleasures are conducive or 
harmful so as to achieve sustainable happiness, Ep-
icurus distinguished between natural-and-necessary 
desires (the katastēmatikē hēdonē) and natural-and-un-
necessary desires (chiefly hēdonē kata kinesin like sen-
sual pleasures and materialistic possession). In addi-
tion, conceivable sources of happiness like reputation, 
glory or wealth are classified as unnatural or empty 
desires (LMen, 127) because they “tend to be vain or 
self-defeating, reaching out for a ‘boundless’ object 
that can yield no stable satisfaction” (Nussbaum 2009, 
112). Such desires have no limit, i.e. they cannot be 
achieved with finite and ready to hand resources and 
there is no clear and definite criterion or limit of sat-
isfaction (ibid.), and, thus, almost necessarily cause 
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stress and frustration. The logical (and neurological) 
antagonist of ataraxía is anxiety, and Epicurus identi-
fied unfounded fears, social isolation and striving for 
empty desires as strong predictors of anxiety.   
This Epicurean framework is highly conducive to eval-
uating some cultural practices outlined above. It has 
been said that in many individualist nations happiness 
is to a significant extent defined in terms of personal 
achievement, while in collectivist cultures there may 
even be a fear of (such) happiness owing to its social-
ly disruptive nature, e.g. as caused by envy from oth-
ers ( Joshanloo 2013). However, also in the US such 
striving may backfire, owing to increased self-focus 
and disappointed expectations (Gruber, Mauss and 
Tamir 2011). In contrast, in some Asian nations the 
conscious pursuit of happiness is positively correlated 
with happiness as its cooperative pursuit may increase 
social connectedness and well-being. At this point it 
needs to be noted that in the US loneliness is almost 
an epidemic and leads to enormous unhappiness (e.g., 
Cacioppo and Patrick 2008), which is not surprising in 
the context of the information presented on the psy-
chological importance of social relations. Such con-
trasts show that both Eastern and Western approaches 
can cause both joy and anxiety. Either individuals are 
always under social scrutiny and may be judged harsh-
ly for fulfilling natural personal desires, or they are ex-
pected to constantly assert themselves and being un-
successful may cause severe stress and frustration.   
Epicurean philosophy solves this issue in an interest-
ing way. One the one hand Epicurus held it that one 
should not be overly concerned with society’s opinion 
(DL, 120) in order to avoid anxiety/achieve serenity 
and that practical reason (phrónēsis) was imperative to 
arrive at the best (personal) decisions (LMen, 132). 
On the other hand, the ancient Epicureans lived in 
a family-like society of friends (e.g., Crespo 2014) 
founded on deep relationships and mutual trust and 
support. This is corroborated in a more global way in 
Ye, Ng and Lian (2014), who assessed whether nine 
well established dimensions of culture (like long-term 
orientation, indulgence/restraint, power distance, 
gender egalitarianism and more) are either positive-
ly or negatively related to subjective well-being. As 
it may not be possible to predict the effects of col-
lectivism and individualism on SWB globally, the 
authors distinguished between in-group collectivism 
and institutional collectivism. They have found that 
the first is negatively related to SWB (see Arrindell 
et al. 1997) as it emphasizes constraints on individ-
uals (and, thus, may cause anxiety), while the latter 
was positively related to SWB as it stresses the feel-
ing of social support while allowing individuals more 
personal freedom (p. 525). This distinction represents 
a highly Epicurean “best of both worlds” idea.   
The authors, in addition, identified two dimensions 
that were very significantly related to SWB with 50% 
and 37% respectively: power distance (PDI) and gen-
der egalitarianism (GEI). PDI refers to inequalities 
owing to prestige, status, wealth or civil rights and 
may cause people to feel they are at the mercy of forc-
es beyond their control. GEI is about the degree to 
which a society minimizes gender role differences. In-
terestingly, Epicurus was the only ancient philosopher 
who allowed women and slaves into his school (or 
“society of friends”) and made no differences based 
on status or gender (see, e.g., Gordon 2004). This is 
part of his doctrine that “of all things that wisdom 
provides for living one’s entire life in happiness, the 
greatest by far is the possession of friendship” (KD, 
27), and this kind of friendship sees no role differ-
ences. In addition, the PDI factors clearly represent 
empty desires which Epicureans try to relinquish 
entirely since they are likely to produce anxiety and 
clearly stand in the way of serenity/imperturbabil-
ity (ataraxía) and self-sufficiency (autárkeia). Thus, 
these findings bear powerful implications on what it 
means for a society to foster citizens’ happiness based 
both on the Epicurean view of the good life and em-
pirical evidence corroborating this philosophy.     
An interesting question is the general status of seren-
ity as the highest good, which is a quiet affect emo-
tion typically associated with Eastern Asian culture 
(see Lee, Lin, Huang and Fredrickson, 2013). Inter-
estingly, Schwartz (2000) already warned against the 
disorientation the pressure of too much choice may 
cause in many WEIRD nations, implying a need for 
more contemplation and (Epicurean) self-sufficiency 
(LMen, 130). In addition, a very recent study (Delle-
Fave et al. 2016) researched lay definitions of hap-
piness across 12 countries from different continents 
and coded reports along a number of categories. The 
authors found that 42% of definitions were psycho-
logical in nature, with 19% of definitions referring to 
family and relations. Interestingly, most psychologi-
cal definitions across all continents stressed a type of 
“harmony”, described as inner peace, serenity, balance, 
detachment, peace of mind or tranquility (only Cro-
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atia and Mexico did not stress this point), indicating 
the universal value of this télos and challenging some 
of the “clear split” research cited above. It is also my 
own observation as a teacher of positive psychology, 
Buddhist philosophy and Hellenistic theories of hap-
piness that perhaps people in WEIRD cultures feel 
disoriented and thus describe a need for some kind of 
inner balance. Delle-Fave et al. (2016) themselves no-
ticed the analogy to Epicurean ataraxía and note that 
“harmony presents the core feature of happiness in its 
individual and social manifestations, as it presupposes 
connections or bonds at the intra and interpersonal 
level” (p. 19). 
Conclusion
This article has reviewed a number of cultural differ-
ences between Western individualist and (predomi-
nantly) Asian collectivist cultures. Such differences 
stretch from the general question concerning whether 
people really want to achieve happiness as a primary 
life goal, to social expectations and motivated behav-
ior across nations, to specific predictors of happiness 
in a given society, and the kinds of emotions or ex-
pression of affect that are felt when people describe 
themselves as “happy” or “satisfied”. By utilizing con-
cepts from both Positive Psychology and Epicurean 
philosophy, broader, more inclusive categories can be 
created to explain assumptions from individual tra-
ditions. As “happiness” seems to be quite universally 
a prime motivator of human action, diverse cultural 
practices may address very similar basic psychological 
needs. Beyond how people may choose to report or 
express resulting emotions, the state of serenity and 
social harmony appears to be a strong predictor of 
happiness the world over.  
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Endnotes 
[1] This statement has been heavily criticized in
Greek and Roman antiquity and beyond as many
philosophers found it inconceivable that “pleasure
[hedonic happiness] and virtue [eudaimonic happi-
ness] are inseparable” (LMen, 132). However, recent
research on the functional neuroanatomy of pleasure
and happiness (see Kringelbach and Berridge 2009;
Berridge & Kringelbach 2013 for the following in-
formation) seems to corroborate Epicurus’ hypothesis
that well-being involves both eudaimonic (abiding)
and hedonic (simple) pleasure as both have been em-
pirically found to converge in the same individuals.
Specifically, brain mechanisms (interlinked subcorti-
cal hedonic hot spots, cortical pleasure coding in re-
gions of the orbifrontal cortex, mesolimbic dopamine
transmission, and others) involved in simple pleasures
overlap with those for higher-order pleasures. It is
probable that eudaimonic/higher/abiding pleasures
such as socializing, altruism or transcendence all draw
upon the same neurobiological roots – hedonic brain
activation and cortical pleasure coding – that original-
ly evolved for sensory pleasures. In addition, studies
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using deep brain stimulation and magnetoencepha-
lography provide evidence for a view of happiness as 
freedom from distress (aponía and ataraxía?). Finally, 
neurobiological research on “happiness” allows for the 
conclusion that hedonic happiness can be conceived 
as ‘liking’ without ‘wanting’, i.e. as a state of content-
ment without disruptive desires which can spiral into 
maladaptive patterns such as addiction. This can be 
seen to empirically corroborate Epicurus’ emphasis 
on relinquishing empty desires (see below) and on 
achieving self-sufficiency (autárkeia) via practical rea-
son (phrónēsis).
